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INTRODCCTION
Collusion is a social behavior for which opportunity to conmru.- 
nicate has been found to be a necessary but not sufficient cause 
(Seibold and Steinfat, 1975)- This previous research conceptualized 
communication simply. Subjects were given the opportunity to communi­
cate verbally in a face-to-face setting or they were allowed no oppor­
tunities for communication. Verbal behavior constitutes a manifest 
element of communication. Verbal behavior can be conceptualized as a 
complex set of variables which may be found to be related to personality, 
situational variables, or other social behaviors. This conceptualiza­
tion of communication in terms of verbal behavior leads to the observa­
tion that perhaps variances in verbal behavior may account for the pre­
vious findings. That is, there may be observable differences in the 
verbal behaviors found in collusive and non-collusive relationships.
This dissertation reports an investigation of certain manifest 
aspects of verbal behavior encoded by human subjects engaged in collu­
sive and non-collusive relationships. The personality variable, 
Machiavellianism, and the situational variable, power, are also con­
sidered. The dissertation is organized into four chapters. The first
1
2chapter presents hoth a rationale for the study, and the hypotheses to 
which the study is addressed. The second chapter consists of a discus­
sion of the procedures utilized in gathering and analyzing the data.
The third chapter presents the results of the data analysis. The final 
chapter consists of a discussion of the results and significance of the 
study, and suggestions for future research.
CHAPTER I 
RA.TIOMLE AED HYPOTHESES
Three assumptions which are common to communication scholars 
underly this investigation. The first assumption is that communication 
"behavior may be a cause of other social behavior. The second assumption 
is that each or both of two classes of variables may be antecedent to 
communication behavior : (l) The actor's personality may affect the com­
munication; (2) the situation may affect the communication; or (3) the 
actor's personality and the situation may interact to affect communica­
tion. A third assumption is that verbal behavior constitutes primary 
evidence for communication and is the most abundant and accessible data 
concerning communication.
These assumptions lead to a consideration of four class variables 
whose interrelationship is the focus of this investigation : (l) Social 
behavior for which communication is a causal variable ; (2) personality 
variables ; (3) situational variables; and (4) verbal behavior. Speci­
fically, the purpose is to investigate the relationship between the social 
behavior of collusion; a situational variable of power; a personality 
variable, Machiavellianism; and two aspects of verbal behavior, syntax 
and utterances.
To explicate the rationale for this study, the remainder of this 
chapter is divided into five sections. In the first section, the re­
search strategy which underlies the investigation is presented. In the 
second section, the social behavior variable of collusion is discussed.
In section three, the situational variable of power is examined. Section 
four presents the relevant literature for the personality variable, 
Machiavellianism, and a hypothetical relationship between Machiavellian­
ism and power is suggested. In the final section, relationships between 
collusion, power, Machiavellianism, and the verbal behavior variables of 
syntax and utterances are hypothesized.
Research Strategy
In its most general sense, the purpose of this study is to in­
crease understanding of communication by studying the relationship of 
certain manifest aspects to other meaningful social variables. One way 
to generate information concerning the relationship between situational 
variables, personality variables, and communication is to study their 
interrelationships within an experimental task for which communication 
has previously been identified as an essential determinant of some other 
social behavior such as collusion.
A simple logic provides the rationale underlying the need for a 
task in which communication is an essential ingredient to some social 
outcome. As will be seen in the next section of this study, a kind of 
social outcome is collusion. If communication is always present when 
collusion occurs, but communication also can occur without collusion, 
then communication is a necessary but not sufficient condition for collu­
sion. Communication, however, is a complex phenomena; it is defined
5diversely (Dance and Larson, 1976). It may be that communication has 
been defined so broadly that we reach a false conclusion about its 
"necessary but not sufficient" nature. Without "sufficiency," a state­
ment of "necessary" conditions is less precise. If we had a more pre­
cise definition, or if we viewed communication as a complex of several 
variables, we may find more useful knowledge claims can be made. Greater 
precision in the defining of communication might allow us to make state­
ments about what is necessary, what is sufficient, and what is necessary 
and sufficient.
It is just such a concern that motivates this study. In order 
to do this, this chapter will discuss the relationship between the social 
behavior of collusion and communication. Power will be described, then, 
as a situational variable found in communication; a discussion of Machia­
vellianism as a personality variable related both to power and communica­
tion will follow. The chapter will close with a discussion of the inter­
relationships between collusion, power, Machiavellianism, and certain 
verbal behaviors characteristic of communication. Hypothesized relation­
ships will be part of this last section, and submitted for testing in a 
concern for better understanding of the role of communication and human 
behavior.
Collusion
Collusion occurs when two or more individuals enter into a 
mutually beneficial agreement at the expense of some third individual 
or social institution (Steinfatt, 1973). Kickbacks and bribes are the 
most obvious examples of collusion. A more abstract example is the 
victimless crime such as prostitution or drug trafficking, where the
6expense to society is hypothetical. However, "because collusion in most 
cases is considered immoral or illegal, it is a form of social "behavior 
which is generally not readily accessible to study.
When a form of social behavior is not directly accessible, game 
simulations provide a realistic alternative for study (Gofflnan, 1969). 
Game-simulations are of particular interest because they allow the study 
of particular classes of behavior and their relationships to variables 
of theoretic interest under controlled laboratory conditions.
Steinfatt (1973) has developed a game simulation which provides 
an opportunity to study collusive behavior. Called the "Creative Alter­
native Game", the simulation is a two person, non-zero sum game. The 
game is defined in the following manner:
A CA (creative alternative) game may be defined as a matrix 
in which (l) there exists only one rational choice for one 
player (o) but a mixed motive situation for the other player 
(p); (2) the choice of his best move by o must result in 
only one rational choice remaining for p; (3) the payoff to 
both players from this semi-forced solution must be equal;
(4) the total pay-off to both players must be a maximum 
when both fail to choose their rational alternative (for p 
this means the alternative shot is rational when o chooses 
rationally) and should be on the order of twice the total 
payoff available from the mutual rational choice cell; and
(5) neither player has fate control over the other if the 
other chooses his rational alternative (Steinfatt and 
Miller, 1974, 62).
The choices in the game matrix provide a simple operationalization 
of the concept of collusion (see Figure l). agreeing to split either
points or a reward associated with maximizing the points of a single 
player and choosing the BD alternative, the players (p and o) may maxi­
mize their own rewards at the expense of a third party (the house or 
experimenter). All other combinations of choices are non-collusive. 
Previous research using the Creative Alternative Game (Steinfatt, 1973;
7Steinfatt, Seibold, and Frye, 1974) indicates that opportunity for com­
munication is a necessary cause of collusion. Seibold and Steinfatt 
(1974, 7) observe that "the CA. game yields maximum rewards to both play­
ers only if they agree to side payments, and to form a joint strategy 
which has no rational basis; and would not be possible without communica­
tion."
Another characteristic of the Creative Alternative Game is that 
it allows the investigation of the effects of power differences upon be­
havior. The concept of power and its operationalization in the Creative 
Alternative Game is discussed in the following section.
Power
Power theorists (i.e. March, 1955; Schur, I969, Harsanyi, I962) 
generally define power in terms of the ability to influence the outcome 
of particular interactions. To understand the concept of "power" as a 
situational variable, it is necessary to understand how situations, in 
general may differ.
At present there is no viable theory of situations. In the 
field of communication, Hewes, Haight, and Szalay (1976) have noted the 
need to develop a theoretic language to describe situations. While the 
study of human ecology (Barker, 196O, I963, 19^5, 1968) is still in its 
infancy, it is possible to identify some superordinate categories for a 
taxonomy of situations. Categories of situational variables considered 
relevant to communication events are discussed below.
The communication "situation" is considered to be a cognitive 
state, constructed by communicators. A considerable body of evidence 
for this proposition has been amassed by the proponents of attribution
8theory (e.g. Heider, 1958; Bern, 1972; Kelley, 1972). Given this perspec­
tive, the researcher must then reconstruct situations by identifying the 
information used by participants as they construct communication situa­
tions .
Two categories of information appear to influence the construc­
tion of communication situations. The first category of information con­
sists of the prior cognitions of the participants. This information is 
not readily accessible to the observer of a situation, but is inferred 
from data such as attitudinal pre-tests, personality measures, and demo­
graphics. Because of its personal inferential nature, this type of 
information is labeled idiosyncratic. The second type of information is 
provided by the physical, unalterable elements of the communication set­
ting. This type of information which is readily accessible to both actor 
and observer is labeled contextual.
There are three categories of idiosyncratic information: cul­
tural, sociological, and psychological (Miller and Steinberg, 1975). 
Cultural information consists of knowledge of beliefs, habits, practices, 
and communication of large geographically defined groups.
Sociological knowledge is similar to cultural knowledge. How­
ever, they differ in several significant ways. Social groups tend to 
have fewer members than cultures. Membership in social groups is likely 
to be voluntary. Membership in social groups is not restricted by cul­
tural identification.
There are two types of psychological information: dispositional
and cognitive. Personality attributes are dispositional information. 
Cognitive information consists of the actors unique Imowledge of the 
behavioral characteristics of particular others and prior events.
9There are two categories of contextual information. The first 
category of contextual information is identified as physical/adaptive. 
Background noise is an example of this type of information. In the 
presence of background noise, the participants in a communication event 
speak more loudly.
The second type of contextual information is labeled symbolic. 
Symbolic information is a function of the interaction between the phy­
sical environment and the actor’s store of idiosyncratic information.
Power and status may be used as examples of symbolic information. 
A priest’s collar (physical cue) provides information concerning status 
only if the actor is familiar with the practices of the social groups 
known as Catholics and Episcopalians. Guns in the hands of conquista­
dores intially were not symbols of power for the natives of Peru and 
Mexico who had no cognitive information about their effect.
In the game setting, differences in power are a function of the 
alternatives made available through the game matrix. When points deter­
mine rewards and a player’s choice has an impact on the points received 
by the other player, points take on psychological significance and func­
tion as tokens of power.
Following Harsanyi (1962), the relative power relationship be­
tween players p and o in the Creative Alternative Game is determined by 
the probability of p or o getting the other to adopt the Creative strate­
gy (the BD choice) when the other has initially adopted the rational 
strategy (the A or C choice). An analysis of the game matrix (see Figure 
1) reveals that the maximum possible payoff during any game round is 4 
for o and 20 for p. However, p ’s success is dependent upon the behavior
10
FIGÜEE 1 
Creative Alternative Game Matrix
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B
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of o. Because p may derive maximum benefits from the BD strategy, it is 
reasonable to assume that the probability of o persuading p to engage in 
this strategy is greater than the probability of p persuading o. There­
fore, o is considered to be more powerful than p.
Both power and communication are variables which have been linked 
to the personality variable of Machiavellianism. The relevant litera­
ture of Machiavellianism is reviewed next.
Machiavellianism
Machiavellianism (Christie and Geis, 1968, 1970) is a personality 
construct related to willingness to manipulate others. It is a variable 
of increasing interest to communication theorists because its literary 
and historical roots lie in communication situations. Christie initial­
ly hypothesized the Machiavellian to be characterized by: (l) a relative
lack of effect in interpersonal relationships; (2) a lack of concern with 
conventional morality; (3) a, lack of gross psychopathology; and (4) low 
ideological commitment. Subsequent research indicates the high Machia­
vellian is amoral, resistant to social pressure, cognitively oriented, 
distrusts people, initiates structure and controls interaction when pos­
sible and is relatively unaffected by his own beliefs. The low Machia­
vellian, on the other hand, believes in an implicit morality, is sus­
ceptible to social pressure, is influenced by implicit assumptions about 
social behavior, is distracted by the process of interaction, and is 
affected by his own behaviors.
Machiavellianism was identified as a personality variable of 
interest for three reasons. First, it is one of the few personality 
constructs whose theoretic literature takes into account the situation.
12
Second, a considerable body of literature exists which suggests that 
Machiavellianism is related to communication behavior. Third, previous 
research (Geis, 1970b) links Machiavellianism to position power in a 
game setting.
Important for the present study is the Christie and Geis (1970) 
contention that there is an interaction between the dispositional char­
acteristics of Machiavellianism and the environmental-psychological sit­
uation. The three situational variables identified by Christie and 
Geis are: (l) Face-to-Face Interaction— where subjects are physically
present and have the opportunity to observe and communicate with each 
other; (2) Latitude for Improvisation— where the structure of the task 
is sufficiently ambiguous to allow subjects to improvise both the con­
tent and timing of responses; (3) Irrelevant Affect— where there is the 
potential for personal and emotional involvement with either people or 
issues.
The three variables were identified through an analysis of 50 
experimental studies involving bargaining games or attitude change. In 
13 of the 13 studies where face-to-face interaction, latitude for improv­
isation, and the potential for irrelevant affect were judged present, 
results indicated that "high Machs won more, were persuaded less, per­
suaded others more, or behaved as predicted significantly (Christie and 
Geis, 1970, p. 289)" when compared to low Machiavellians. In the 11 
studies where none of the situational variables were present, no signi­
ficant differences in behavior were observed. In 7 of the twelve studies 
in which two of the variables were present, high Machiavellians performed 
differently from low Machiavellians. Finally, differences were observed
13
in only 5 of the 13 studies in which one of the three variables was 
present.
Several subsequent studies have tended to provide additional 
support for the Machiavellianism-situation interaction. Burgoon (1971) 
tested the relationship between Machiavellianism and success in a loose­
ly structured communication course and a highly structured public speak­
ing course. Also, as expected, there was no significant relationship 
between Machiavellianism and success in the highly structured course.
Young and Hurt (1973) observed a significant interaction between 
Machiavellianism and channel of communication for attitude change. There 
were no differences in attitude change between high and low Machiavellians 
in audio-tape and written channel conditions, while in a live channel 
condition, high Machiavellians exhibited less attitude change than low 
Machiavellians. Another interesting finding of Young and Hurt was that 
high Machiavellians preferred the live channel condition, while low 
Machiavellians were equally satisfied by all conditions.
Hazleton (1976) found that high and low Machiavellians perceived 
the credibility of a non-interpersonal source similarly, while they per­
ceived the credibility of an interpersonal source type differently.
Taken together, these studies provide compelling evidence for the 
Machiavellianism-situation interaction. It is most interesting to note 
that the conditions under which differences in behavior as a function 
of Machiavellianism have been observed are almost precisely the condi­
tions which Mischel (1973) suggests are necessary for personality dif­
ferences to be manifested in behavior. A summary of the effects of the 
personality-situation interaction for Machiavellianism is provided in
14
Figure 2 (adapted from Christie and Geis, 1970, p. 351).
The second reason that Machiavellianism was selected as a varia­
ble of interest is that a considerable body of research exists linking 
Machiavellianism to communication. This link is seen in studies of 
deception, manipulation, and bargaining.
Exline, Thibaut, Hickey, and Gumpert (l970) studied the relation­
ship of Machiavellianism to deception. While their primary variable of 
interest was non-verbal behavior (visual interaction), they do provide 
data which is suggestive of verbal differences as well. In the experi­
ment, each of 48 subjects (24 males, 24 females) were either implicated 
in cheating on an experimental task (H=40) or not implicated (N=8). 
Following the manipulation, each subject was interviewed by the experi­
menter concerning his/her behavior during the experiment. The interview 
was divided into two portions. The first portion of the interview con­
sisted of open-ended questions about the method used by subjects to ar­
rive at their answers to the problem. The second portion of the inter­
view consisted of the subjects responses to the experimenter's accusa­
tions of cheating.
Judgements of the plausibility of statements in the pre and post 
accusation conditions were made by judges using the audio tape data. Ho 
significant differences were observed between high and low Machiavellians 
in the pre-accusation condition. In the post-accusation condition, high 
Machiavellians were judged to lie more plausibly than low Machiavellians.
Knapp, Hart, and Dennis (1974) conducted a study of deceptive 
behavior, focusing upon the role of language choice. Knapp, et al., 
video-taped segments of interviews in which subjects argued both in
15
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favor of and against a proposition concerning veteran's benefits. Seg­
ments in which the subject's arguments were counter to their true beliefs 
were classified as deceptive. Behaviors in deceptive and non-deceptive 
segments were compared.
While a variety of measures related to language choice were used, 
only two yielded significant results. High Machiavellians were observed 
to use significantly more words and significantly more different words 
than low Machiavellians. Analysis of the use of speech errors (e.g. uh, 
er, ah), self references (e.g. I, me, mine), group references (e.g. we, 
us, our), other references (e.g. they, them), past references (e.g. was, 
has, had), future references (e.g. will, shall), absolute verbs (all 
forms of "to be"), qualifications (e.g. may, should, could), and alilness 
terms (e.g. every, all, none) yielded non-significant results.
The findings of Knapp and his colleagues, while somewhat disap­
pointing, are limited. First, it is possible that the situation was not 
salient for the high Machiavellian subjects. In contrast to the study 
of Exline, et al. (1970), where deception was induced without subject's 
awareness of the intent of the study, the subjects of Knapp, et al., were 
aware of the purpose of the study. That is to say that there was no 
perception of consequences connected with the outcome of the experiment 
for these subjects, as there was for the subjects of the Exline study. 
Second, Knapp, et al., did not test for interactions between Machiavel­
lianism and deception for the language variables.
Several studies suggest that the communication behaviors of high 
Machiavellians are more manipulative than the communication behaviors of 
low Machiavellians. Geis, Christie, and Nelson (1970), McLaughlin (1970)
17
and Bergner (1972) studied communication in situations which provided 
opportunities for manipulations.
Subjects (N-27) in the Geis, et al. (1970) study were placed in 
the role of experimenter and asked to administer a personality test to 
another subject (stooge) after having taken the same test themselves. 
Subjects were informed that the previous student experimenter who had 
tested them had performed three simple deceptions, and the subjects 
were given permission to "use your power arbitrarily" in testing their 
subjects. Verbal and non-verbal behaviors of subjects were observed by 
a hidden observer who judged behaviors as manipulative or non-manipula­
tive. Those behaviors judged manipulative were coded into predefined 
categories. Behaviors which could not be coded were either recorded or 
paraphrased. Verbal behaviors were coded by internal content (meaning) 
and behaviors recorded as a single manipulation, ranged from a single 
word to several sentences. Initially, six categories of verbal manipu­
lations and four categories of non-verbal manipulations were used. To 
account for uncodable behaviors, an additional five verbal manipulation 
categories were developed.
Analysis of the data revealed significant differences in the 
number of manipulations performed, variety of manipulations performed, 
magnitude of lies told, number of verbal distractions, number of inno­
vative manipulations, and variety of innovative manipulations.
Two of these differences were especially revealing. The first 
difference reflects the total number of manipulations. High Machiavel­
lians averaged 15-^3 manipulative acts per administration compared to an 
average of 7.08 acts by the Low Machiavellians. The second difference
18
of interest is the number of innovative manipulations, manipulations 
not suggested by the experimental induction. High Machiavellians 
averaged 5*93 innovative manipulations ranging across an average of 3*57 
categories compared to an average of I .69 innovative acts across 1.15  
different categories for the Low Machiavellians.
In contrast to the verbal data, the analysis of non-verbal be­
haviors was disappointing. Only 8 of the 27 subjects engaged in non­
verbal manipulations. Of those 8, six were High Machiavellians. While 
means for the two groups differed in the expected direction, the dif­
ferences were not significant.
McLaughlin (1970) conducted a study similar to that of Geis, et 
al. (1970), using a verbal learning task as the experimental situation. 
McLaughlin found that High Machiavellians were more manipulative than 
Low Machiavellians, particularly with respect to the use of threats and 
deception.
Bergner (1972) investigated the use of influence attempts in a 
simulated industrial setting. Subjects (N=I20) played the role of 
supervisor for h workers located in another room, two of whom produced 
above standard and two of whom produced below standard. Subjects were 
told that they would be rewarded if they could get all four workers to 
produce above standard. Subjects were placed in either a reward, coer­
cion, or reward-plus-coercion condition and worker production was held 
constant for all subjects. Berger found no significant differences in 
the number of influence attempts by High and Low Machiavellians. Influ­
ence attempts made by High Machiavellians were, however, judged more 
manipulative than those by Low Machiavellians.
19
Several bargaining type studies also indicate that High and Low 
Machiavellians communicate differently. Studies by Geis (1970a) and 
Schwendiman (l97l) provide indirect evidence. A recent study by Long 
(1976) provides more direct evidence.
Geis (1970a) attempted to determine how High Machiavellians 
achieved success in a three-person-bargaining game. Geis used three 
trained observers to identify and code five game-relevant behaviors dur­
ing each session. The five behaviors were: (l) proposals to form a
coalition; (2) acceptance of coalition proposals; (3) rejection of coali­
tion proposals; (4) breaking of existing coalition conditions; and (5) 
advice, a suggestion or warning designed to influence other players.
While these five variables represent only a portion of the total 
interaction, they do appear to reflect critical communication encounters. 
Interestingly, only one of these variables yielded significant results. 
High Machiavellians were more likely to maintain existing coalitions 
and Low Machiavellians were more likely to break existing coalitions.
The lack of significant findings for the remaining variables could be 
interpreted to suggest that there are no significant differences in the 
communication behaviors of High and Low Machiavellians.
Two factors suggest that such an interpretation is not warranted. 
First, High Machiavellians were more successful than Low îfechiavellians. 
To the extent that communication is a critical element in the game situ­
ation, differences must exist at some level of analysis. Second, an 
analysis of the distribution of behaviors suggests that some differences 
must exist. Analysis of the distribution of behaviors revealed that 
there was a significant tendency for communication to be directed at
20
the High Machiavelliaris. Gels (1970) provides a description of the
pervasive nature of the Machiavellian influences.
At the first step in creating structure, making offers.
High Machiavellians did not differ from other players 
except for virtually imperceptible tendencies to make 
more and better offers. Even without statistically 
discernable salience, however, they somehow elicited 
significantly more offers from each of the other two 
members of the triad than either of them drew from the 
other. . .at each succeeding step in determining the 
final group structure, the controlling influence of the 
higher Machiavellian in the group was apparent (p. l42-l43).
Schwendiman (1971) also investigated Machiavellian behavior in 
a three-person bargaining game. Schwendiman found no significant dif­
ferences between High and low Machiavellians for the amount of money 
won in either a low incentive or a high incentive condition. However, 
the offers of High Machiavellians in the high incentive condition were 
judged more aggressive than the offers of the Low Machiavellians.
Long (1976) investigated the communication behavior of High and 
Low Machiavellians in a bargaining situation using the Bales (1950) 
Interaction Process Analysis system. Long’s subjects were asked to 
reach consensus on a problem solving case involving ethical and moral 
issues. Prior to interacting, one subject was asked to indicate a prior 
position on an attitude instrument and informed that the other partici­
pant had taken an opposite position. The subject was then told he
would be paid one dollar for each step on the attitude scale the other
subject moved toward the first subject’s position. The second subject 
was simply informed of the first subject’s position and told that he 
would be paid one dollar for each change away from the first subject’s
original position on the attitude instrument. Consistent with ex­
pectations, High Machiavellians won three times as much money as Low
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Machiavellians.
Long analyzed communication in randomly selected segments of 
video tapes. His analysis revealed that in contrast to Low Machiavelli­
ans, Highs were less cooperative, less tension relieving, less agreeable, 
and gave fewer suggestions. Low Machiavellians sought more information 
and suggestions than did High Machiavellians. Finally, High Machiavel­
lians were judged to be more antagonistic than Low Machiavellians.
The body of research reviewed here suggests strongly that under 
the appropriate conditions High and Low Machiavellians communicate dif­
ferently. As language is the primary vehicle for communication, it is 
reasonable to assume that differences in language behavior may account 
for Machiavellian behavior. Only a single study among those reviewed 
attempted to study language as a variable in Machiavellian behavior and 
with disappointing results. As with any area of research, the results 
of a single study should not be considered conclusive. It is possible 
that the Knapp, et al. experimental induction was not salient for High 
Machiavellians or that the language categories utilized were not appro­
priate. The present study represents a second attempt to link language 
to Machiavellian behavior.
The studies reviewed above suggest three types of experimental 
situations in which High and Low Machiavellians communicate differently: 
Deception, manipulatiun, and bargaining. In the present study, commu­
nication in a bargaining situation will be studied. The bargaining sit­
uation has been selected because in contrast to the other two situations, 
bargaining games allow the operationalization of power as a situational 
variable. Also, power as a variable in Machiavellian behavior has been
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previously investigated.
Geis (1970b) studied the relationship between Machiavellianism, 
power, and success in a three person bargaining game. The game involved 
bargaining for shares of a total payoff of 100 points. Each player re­
ceived a hand of six power cards at the beginning of each game.
During each turn a player would throw a pair of dice and move his marker 
a multiple of the higher die value determined by a power card used from 
his hand. The first player to reach the goal received the 100 points. 
Players were allowed to form coalitions and distribute points as they 
pleased. Power was distributed in such a manner as to allow any two 
players to form a winning coalition. Two power conditions were inves­
tigated: One in which all powerhands were known to all players (unam­
biguous), and one in which players were aware of only their own hands 
(ambiguous).
Interestingly, differences in success for the High Machiavellians 
were observed in the two power conditions. Geis found that in the am­
biguous power situation. High Machiavellians outscored Low Machiavellians 
independent of power position. In the unambiguous power situation, the 
average score of High Machiavellians increased with power.
Thus, an unambiguous power situation and Machiavellianism pro­
vides an opportunity to explore how the interaction between a personality 
variable and the situation is expressed through communication behavior. 
Because the Creative Alternative Game represents an unambiguous power 
situation the following relationship between Machiavellianism and Collu­
sion is hypothesized in this study.
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% :  Dyads in which player o has a higher Machiavellianism,
score than p will he more likely to engage in collu­
sion than dyads in which p has a higher score than o.
Hypothesized Verbal Behaviors
Verbal behavior, as a reflection of an individual's reality, 
contains elements of both personality and situation. That is in a prac­
tical sense, we often define personalities and situations based on ob­
servations of linguistic utterances and the manner in which they are 
constructed. Consequently, personality, situation, and verbal behavior 
are best viewed as related variables. In the following sections, rela­
tionships between selected verbal behavior variables, and collusion, 
power, and Machiavellianism are hypothesized.
The hypotheses presented here fall into two categories: Hypo­
theses which are suggested by previous literature and hypotheses which 
are derived from a consideration of the characteristics of the variables 
to be studied. Ten hypotheses relating to nine verbal behaviors are 
presented. Verbal behaviors of interest are: Total words, total utter­
ances, nouns, nouns with sensory referents, nouns accompanied by one or 
more modifiers, verbs accompanied by one or more modifiers, total unmod­
ified verbs and nouns, self reference pronouns, and feedback cues (e.g. 
yes, no, why).
Total words and total utterances are indices of the amount of 
verbal behavior occurring. An utterance is the conceptual equivalent 
of the sentence in written communication. Two of the studies reviewed 
in the Machiavellianism section suggest that High Machiavellians commu­
nicate more than Low Machiavellians. Geis, et al. (1970) observed that 
High Machiavellians engaged in more manipulative acts than Low Machia-
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vellians. Khapp, et al. (1975) observed that High Machiavellians used 
more total words than Low Machiavellians. In the present study, the 
following hypotheses related to Machiavellianism and amount of verbal 
behavior are tested.
H2: There will be a significant positive correlation
between Machiavellianism and the total number of 
words encoded.
Eg: There will be a significant positive correlation
between Machiavellianism and the number of utter­
ances encoded.
Some nouns are used to denote sensory aspects of reality; Per­
sons, places, or things. Other nouns may have non-sensory referents.
The use of adjectives or prepositional phrases as modifiers of nouns 
increases their specificity of meaning. In contrast to Low Machiavel­
lians, High Machiavellians are described as cognitively oriented, at­
tending to explicit cues in the environment. This facet of the Machia­
vellian character suggests the following hypotheses which are tested in 
the present study.
Hlj.: There will be a significant positive correlation
between Machiavellianism and the use of nouns.
H5: There will be a significant positive correlation
between Machiavellianism and the use of nouns 
with sensory referents.
Hg; There will be a significant positive correlation 
between Machiavellianism and the use of nouns 
accompanied by one or more modifiers.
Feedback cues are defined conceptually as any linguistic element 
encoded by a participant in a conversation which reduces ambiguity for 
another participant. Words included in this category indicate either 
agreement, disagreement, or the need for additional information. Three 
assumptions are made about feedback cues and their use in this study.
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First, effective bargaining should be characterized by an efficient 
exchange of information. Second, feedback cues are responses. Third, 
High Machiavellians initiate and control interaction when possible.
These assumptions suggest the following hypotheses which are tested in 
this study.
Hy: Collusive dyads will encode significantly more feedback
cues than non-collusive dyads.
Eg: There will be a significant negative correlation between
Machiavellianism and the use of feedback cues.
Self-reference pronouns such as I, me, we, and us, are used in 
utterances which indicate behavioral intentions or states, or which 
reflect upon past or future behaviors. Collusion requires an effective 
coordination of behavior and an understanding of each player's alterna­
tives. The following hypothesis concerning the use of self-reference 
pronouns is tested.
H^: Collusive dyads will use significantly more self-
reference pronouns than non-collusive dyads.
In the bargaining situation the modifying of verb forms should
reflect hesitation or uncertainty in regard to potential or desired
courses of behavior. For example, in response to the question, what do
you think we should do, a certain response would be, I will take B and
you will take D. An uncertain response would be, "I really am not sure,'*
where "really" and "not" are adverbs modifying a state of being. These
verbal behaviors should occur primarily as responses. If the expected
Machiavellian-by-power interaction occurs, then the following is expected
concerning the use of modified verb forms.
There will be a significant power-by-collusion 
interaction for the use of verbs accompanied by 
modifiers.
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The hypotheses outlined so far suggest that High Machiavelligns 
will encode similar messages independent of position. The responses of 
Low Machiavellians will distinguish between collusive and non-collusive 
dyads. These expectations and the previous expectations concerning the 
use of modified verbs and nouns suggest one additional hypothesis con­
cerning the total number of unmodified verbs and nouns.
Players in the p position will use more unmodified 
verbs and nouns than players in the o position.
Summary
This chapter has presented a rationale for this study and 
identified hypotheses which this study seeks to test. By studying the 
relationship between verbal behavior and personality variables, situa­
tional variables, and other social behaviors, knowledge of the role of 
verbal behavior in communication should be generated. Opportunity for 
communication is a necessary cause for collusion. The situation in 
which collusion can occur provides an opportunity to study the effects 
of power as a situational variable. Machiavellianism is a personality 
variable linked to success in bargaining games, power, and communication. 
Eleven hypotheses were generated concerning the inter-relationship be­
tween variables.
The methods and procedures used in the gathering and analysis 
of the data necessary to test the hypotheses posed in this chapter are 
presented in the following chapter.
CHA.PTER II 
METHODS AHD EROCEDUEES
This chapter outlines the methods and procedures used in the 
gathering and analysis of data for this experiment. The chapter describes 
the subjects of the study, the scales and procedures used for the gather­
ing of data, and the steps taken in the analysis of the data.
Subjects
The subjects (H=42) of this study were male -undergraduates 
enrolled in an introductory speech course at a large midwestern univer­
sity. Randomly selected subjects from this population voluntarily par­
ticipated in data-gathering sessions outside of class.
Procedures
Approximately four weeks prior to the gathering of experimental 
data, the Mach IV Scale (Christie and Geis, 1970) was administered in 
mil sections of the basic speech course. The Mach IV scale is a 20-item 
instrument designed to measure Machiavellianism . The items are presented 
in a standard six-category LLkert format -with half of the items reversed. 
The High Machiavellian responses are scored from "5" to "7"> and the Low 
Machiavellian responses are scored from "1" to "3". No response is 
scored a "4". Christie and Geis suggest that a constant of "20" be added
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to the total score to create a neutral score of "100". Adding the 
constant, the lowest possible score is "40" and the highest is "l60". 
Christie and Geis (1970) report a mean reliability for the Mach TV 
across 9 subject populations of .79 and a mean item test correlation of 
.38. A copy of the Mach IV scale is contained in Appendix A.
A total of 2kh males and 189 females successfully completed the 
questionnaire. The group mean and standard deviation for the males were 
9^.85 and l4.04 respectively. The group mean and standard deviation for 
the females were 89.07 and 13.646. This is consistent with Christie's 
and Geis' (1970) observation that females tend to score lower on mea­
sures of Machiavellianism than males.
Due to the potential for a high subject attrition rate in re­
search of the present type, 132 randomly selected males were identified 
as potential research subjects. A group mean and standard deviation of 
94.61 and 15.92 on the Mach IV scale indicated that this sanrple was 
representative of the parent population. The selected subjects were 
contacted during regular class periods about participating in data- 
gathering sessions.
Those subjects contacted were informed that they had been ran­
domly selected from the males enrolled in the basic speech course as 
potential subjects in a study of game playing behavior. They were told 
that participation was voluntary and that approximately one hour of time 
outside of class, to be arranged at their convenience, would be required. 
The subjects were told that they would play a simple game with one 
other student and that the game did not require prior training or physical 
skills. To induce participation and to make the situation salient, the
29
subjects were informed that at the end of the study, the player with the 
highest score would receive a reward of fifteen dollars ($15.00), and 
the player with the second highest score would receive a reward of ten 
dollars ($10.00). They were then asked if they would be willing to 
participate in the study.
Volunteers were informed that they could not be paired with a 
member of their own class or with someone they knew from another section 
of the basic course and then asked to indicate, on a previously prepared 
schedule sheet, when they would be able to participate in the research. 
Sessions listed were scheduled to begin and end on the hour. The first 
volunteer for each session was listed as subject A and the second volun­
teer for each session was listed as subject B. Eighty-two subjects 
volunteered to participate.
Data was collected over a period of l4 days and a total of 5^ 
subjects participated in data-gathering sessions. Analysis of the Mach 
IV scores of these subjects yielded a group mean of 9^*50 and a standard 
deviation of 15.07, indicating that this group was representative of the 
parent population.
Subjects A and B were alternately assigned to the p and o condi­
tions immediately prior to participating in data gathering sessions. 
Subjects were seated directly across from each other at a comfortable 
conversational distance. Each subject was given a score sheet and a 
sheet of instructions explaining how to use and read a hypothetical game 
matrix (see Appendix B). The game matrix for the Creative Alternative 
game was placed face-dovm in front of each of the participants and they 
were instructed not to look at it until the beginning of the game.
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After both subjects read the instructions, the experimenter 
asked if they understood the instructions. If there were no questions, 
or after any questions were answered, the experimenter briefly repeated 
the instructions orally and again asked if the instructions were clear 
to both players. The subjects were then reminded of the potential for 
monetary rewards.
Each experimental game consisted of 10 two-minute rounds. Each 
round was comprised of a $0 second discussion period and a 30 second 
decision/scoring period. Prior experience with the Creative Alternative 
game indicates that the two-minute round provides a maximum opportunity 
for natural interaction. Subjects become distracted from the task if 
longer periods are utilized. Subjects were notified of the beginning 
of each new round by the sound of a whistle and of the 30 second period 
by a sign placed in their field of vision.
Subjects were told they could communicate freely during the dis­
cussion period, if they desired to do so, and that they were required 
to mark their choice of alternatives for each round upon the score sheet 
and share that information with the other player during the scoring 
period. Subjects were told that points will not be awarded for any 
given round unless instructions are followed explicitly.
During the game, the experimenter was in the room with the sub­
jects seated behind the tape recording equipment. The experimenter wore 
audio-headphones and maintained a posture such that eye contact with the 
subjects was impossible.
Communication behavior of the subjects was recorded using a 
Teac 4010-S stereo-tape deck with unidirectional lavolier microphones.
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Tapes were 1.0 mil polyester on 7-inch reels. All sessions were recorded 
at 3 3/4 inches-per-second. Data tram one pair of subjects was lost 
due to a malfunction of the tape recorder.
Subjects were debriefed in their classes after all data had 
been collected.
Sampling Guidelines 
Two rounds of communication behavior were transcribed and 
analyzed for each pair of subjects. Previous experience with the Crea­
tive Alternative game suggests that subjects become aware of and discuss 
the possibility of engaging in the Creative Alternative in the round 
prior to the round in which they actually select the BD alternative. 
Because the communication behaviors of interest are those which precede 
and coincide with the selection of the Creative Alternative, comparisons 
were made between groups using two rounds of communication preceding the 
selection of the BD alternative and two rounds of communication preced­
ing the selection of some other alternative.
Several factors were taken into consideration in selecting and 
grouping data from dyads for analysis. First, data from pairs of sub­
jects (N=2) who communicated only during the 30 second scoring period 
were not considered for analysis.
There are two reasons for utilizing this criterion. First, 
interest in this study is in situations in which communication is an 
active ingredient. Second, a lack of communication may indicate the 
presence of some experimental artifact contaminating the situation. 
Communication requires cognitive involvement. The more communication 
occurring between subjects, the more they are likely to be successfully
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involved with the experimental situation.
Second, data ftom pairs of subjects (N=3) who engaged in the 
Creative Alternative during all game rounds was not considered for 
analysis. While communication still precedes the selection of the BD 
alternative in this case, the possibility that other prior events are 
effecting behavior in the situation cannot be ruled out. If subjects 
select some other initial strategy, then it can be said, with greater 
certainty, that communication processes occurring in the experimental 
situation contributed to the selection of the Creative Alternative if 
and when it occurs.
The third factor considered was consistency. In a four-alterna­
tive ten-round game, it is expected that the BD alternative might be 
selected on an average of 2.5 times, using a random strategy. To mini­
mize the probability of analyzing data from subjects selecting the BD 
alternative randomly a m i m 'tmiTn criterion of three consecutive BD re­
sponses was used to identify dyads as purposefully adopting the BD 
strategy (Steinfatt, 1975). The probability of three consecutive BD 
choices is approximately 0.02. Thirteen of the 21 dyads meeting criteria 
1 and 2 also met criterion 3-
Because no prior estimate of the percentage of subjects likely 
to meet criterion 3 was available, the following guideline was used in 
the event that the number of subjects meeting this criterion exceeded 
the number which did not. Those dyads which met the minimum criterion 
discussed above, which selected the BD alternative most frequently 
(N=11), not to exceed half of the dyads successfully meeting other 
criteria, were grouped and identified as early adopters for purposes of
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analysis. The remaining dyads which meet the minimum criterion (N=2) 
were identified as late adopters and grouped with subjects which did not 
meet the minimum criterion for purposes of analysis.
The frequency criterion makes certain that there are sufficient 
rounds in which the late adopters did not select the BD alternative to 
make conparisons, as suggested previously, possible. That is, rounds 
of communication for analysis from the late adopters and non-adopters 
were selected from rounds prior to the frequency cut-off figure selected. 
For purposes of convenience, the combined group of late adopters and 
non-adopters will hereafter be referred to as "noncoUusive. " The group 
of early adopters will be identified as "collusive."
Data Analysis
Three types of analysis are discussed here. First, the pro­
cedures used to determine the number of utterances spoken by subjects 
is presented. Second, the procedures used in the content analysis of 
syntactic data are discussed. Third, the statistical procedures and 
decision rules to be used in the analysis of data are discussed.
Distribution Analysis
To determine the number of utterances used by subjects, inde­
pendent judges were used to evaluate typewritten transcripts of the con­
versations of collusive and noncoUusive dyads for selected game rounds. 
This procedure was used because utterances are meaningful within the 
context of conversation and utterances are readily recognizable within 
context by the speakers of the language.
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The following procedures were utilized. Typewritten manuscripts 
of the conversations were prepared. Speaker change was indicated on 
the manuscripts through the use of an asterisk (*) and by capitalizing 
the first letter of the first linguistic unit of a speaker's turn. No 
other forms of punctuation or syntactic cues were provided.
Six sets of messages were constructed from the original set of 
manuscripts, with each manuscript being randomly assigned to three mes­
sage sets. Each message was judged independently by three judges with 
no two judges evaluating the same set of messages.
The six judges were given a training session which included (l) 
a presentation and a discussion of the definition of the utterance con­
struct, and (2) instructions on marking messages to indicate the end and 
beginning of utterances, and (3) the evaluation of two sample messages 
by each judge to determine if the instructions were understood and to 
provide an estimate of inter rater reliability. Analysis of the two 
sample messages yielded an average of 76 percent and 80 percent agree­
ment for the six judges. Instructions given to the judges and copies 
of the sample messages are contained in Appendix C.
Content Analysis
Syntactic data and feedback cues were analyzed using SLCA-II 
(Cummings and Renshaw, 1976), a computer program for analyzing the com­
plex grammatical characteristics of verbal behavior. The categories 
identified by the program are drawn from traditional grammatical taxono­
mies and the prepositional relationships used in formal logic (Cummings, 
1970; Cummings and Renshaw, 1976). Categories corresponding to the 
variables of interest in this study are identifiable using the program.
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To make possible comparisons between messages of varying lengths, 
the program divides the frequency of occurrence for the members of each 
category by the sum of nouns, verbs, and modifiers. Previous research 
(Cummings, 1970) indicates the correlation between this denominator and 
the total number of words in messages is above .90. Because of this 
relationship, the figure obtained by dividing the frequency of occurrence 
within a category by this denominator is the conceptual equivalent of 
a syntactic type-token ratio.
Statistical Analysis
Two aspects of the statistical analysis of data are considered 
here. First, tests used in the analysis of data are identified. Second, 
criteria used in the evaluation of the results of statistical tests are 
discussed.
To test the hypothesized relationship between Machiavellianism 
and power, a test for significant differences between proportions was 
used. The proportion of dyads in which the Mach IV score for 0 was 
greater than the Mach IV score for p which selected the BD alternative 
for at least three consecutive rounds was compared to the proportion of 
dyads in which the Mach IV score for o was less than the Mach IV score 
for p which selected the BD alternative for at least three consecutive 
rounds.
Analysis of co-variance procedures were used to test all rela­
tionships between communication and other variables. Machiavellianism 
was treated as a co-variant with power and collusion treated as fixed 
factors yielding a 2 x 2 factorial analysis of co-variance design.
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Because players p and o are communicating over time together in 
the experimental situation, it could he argued that their behaviors are 
not independent. To test this assumption, and to determine if tests 
for related measures or tests for unrelated measures should be used in 
the analysis of data, Pearson r*s were calculated between players p and 
0 for the dependent verbal behaviors. All r's were non-significant 
(see Table 1 in Appendix D) and it was decided that tests for independent 
measures were appropriate.
Statistical tests are decision-making tools. The interpretation 
of the results of statistical tests, however, is problematic. That is, 
a variety of factors related to the probabilities of error must be 
taken into consideration before deciding whether to: (l) reject the
null hypothesis, (2) not reject the null hypothesis, or (3) suspend 
judgement and wait for more evidence (Hays, 1973).
Cohen (1969) and others (Brewer, 1972; Katzer and Sodt, 1973; 
Chase and Tucker, 1975) have observed that too often social scientists 
do not take into account the probability of incorrectly accepting the 
null hypothesis in interpreting statistical results. The implication 
of these observations is that an uncontrolled rate of ]ÿpe II error 
is undesirable. This leads to the conclusion that in planning and 
interpreting the results of research the social scientist should take 
into account the probability of lÿpe II error relative to the probabil­
ity of üÿpe I error. Cohen (1965) recommends a four to one ratio of Type 
II to Type I error. That is a test for which an alpha level of .05 has 
been established should have power of .80 to maintain the desired 4-1 
ratio. This ratio provides a rule for identifying appropriate
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probability levels for making decisions to accept the null hypothesis 
or to suspend judgement.
In the present study, decisions to reject the null hypothesis 
are based upon an alpha level of .05. That is, statistical values 
•whose probability of occurrence by chance is less than .06 are consid­
ered sufficient e-vidence to reject the null hypothesis. The null hypo­
thesis is not rejected when the probability value for the results of a 
particular test is greater than the probability of beta error divided 
by 4. Judgement is suspended when the probability value for a parti­
cular test is greater than .05 and less than or equal to the estimated 
probability of beta error divided by 4.
The probability of beta error for particular tests was determined 
using tables pro-vided by Cohen (I969). Beta is a function of alpha, n, 
and effect size. The n used for each test, an alpha of .05 and a medium 
effect size were used in determining alpha. Cohen (1965; 97) recommends 
the medium effect size in estimating the power of statistical tests when 
there is no a priori basis for selecting an appropriate effect size.
The critical values for each test used in this study are presented in 
Figure 3-
The procedures and tests outlined here should provide adequate 
tests of the hypotheses suggested in Chapter I. The results of the 
data analysis are presented in Chapter III.
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FIGURE 3
Critical Values for the Interpretation 
of Statistical Tests*
Test Beta
Reject 
the Null 
Hypothesis
Decision 
Not Reject 
the Null 
Hypothesis
Suspend
Judgement
Analysis of 
Co-Variance
Machiavellianism**
(co-variate)
.67 .05 .18 .06 to .17
Power
(main effect)
.64 .05 .17 .06 to .16
Collusion 
(main effect)
.66 .05 .17 .06 to .16
Power X Collusion 
(interaction)
.82 .05 .21 .06 to .20
Test for Significant 
Difference of 
Proportions .64 .05 .17 .06 to .16
* All values are rounded to 2 decimal places.
** Cohen (1969) does not provide power estimates for tests on 
CO-variâtes. The values used are based on a test for main 
effects with df= (l, 37).
CHAPTER III
RESUITS
Three sets of results are reported in this chapter. First, the 
results of the analyses outlined in the preceding chapter are presented. 
Second, on the basis of the reported results, a case is made for 
reanalyzing the data and the results of the reanalyzed data are reported. 
Third, additional variables suggested by the results of the previous 
data analyses are identified and analyzed. For ease of reading, the 
results of the analysis of covariance are organized according to depend­
ent variables. Summary tables for all statistical tests are presented 
in Appendix D.
Decisions concerning the rejection of the null hypothesis for 
tested relationships will be made using the rules outlined in the 
preceding chapter. When the obtained probability value for any test 
statistic is p < .0 5 the decision rule will be to consider the null 
hypothesis rejected. When the obtained probability value is greater 
than the probability of estimated beta error divided by 4 (see Figure
3) the decision rule will be to not reject the null hypothesis. When 
the obtained probability is between these two values the dec: sion rule 
will be to suspend judgement concerning the null hypothesis. These 
decision rules should insure an acceptable ratio of üÿpe I to Type II
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error (Cohen, 1965)-
CoHasion
It was initially hypothesized that dyads in which player o had 
a higher Mach IV score than player p would he most likely to engage in 
collusion. Of the l4 dyads in which player o’s Mach TV score was greater 
than player p's Mach TV score, 10 dyads met the pre-established criterion 
for defining collusive behavior. Seven of 13 dyads in which the Mach 
TV score for player o was less than the Mach TV score for player p were 
identified as engaging in collusion. A test for significant differences 
between proportions yielded a z value of O .919 resulting in a decision 
to not reject the null hypothesis.
Total Words
On the basis of prior research (Geis, et al., 1970; Knapp, et al., 
1975)3 it was hypothesized that a positive relationship would be observed 
between Machiavellianism and the number of words encoded. The results 
of the data analysis (T<1, see Table 2) support a decision to not reject 
the null hypothesis for Hypothesis 2. Tests for unhypothesized relation­
ships also yielded non-significant results (see Table 2).
Total Utterances
Hypothesis^ posits a positive relationship between Machiavellian­
ism and total utterances. Analysis of the data regarding this relation­
ship yielded an F value of 1.011 (df=l,37; p=.32) resulting in a decision 
to not reject the null hypothesis. Tests for unhypothesized relation­
ships also yielded non-significant results (F<1, see Table 3)*
4l
Nouns
Analysis of co-variance for the use of nouns yielded an F value 
of 1.186 (df=l,37j p=.2B) for the collusion by power interaction and 
values of less than 1.0 for all other tests of relationships (see Table
4). On the basis of these results, a decision was made to not reject 
the null hypothesis for Hypothesis]^, which posits a positive relation­
ship between Machiavellianism and the use of nouns.
Nouns With Sensory Referents 
Hypothesis^ suggests a positive relationship between Machiavel­
lianism and the use of nouns with sensory referents. Analysis of the 
data resulted in a decision to not reject the null hypothesis for 
Hypothesis^ (F<1, see Table 5)- No significant relationship was pre­
dicted for the interaction between collusion and power. However, analy­
sis of this relationship yielded an F value of 1.9^5 (df=l,37; p=.l6) 
resulting in a decision to suspend judgement concerning this relationship.
Nouns Accompanied Hy Modifiers 
Hypothesis^ predicted a significant relationship between Machia­
vellianism and the use of nouns accompanied by modifiers. The analysis 
of data resulted in a decision to not reject the null hypothesis for 
Hypothesis^ (F (1,37) = 1.37; p=.2$; see Table 6) and a decision to 
suspend judgement concerning the relationship between power and the use 
of nouns accompanied by modifiers (F (1,37) = 3*572; p=.06).
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Feedback Cues
Analysis of the feedback cue data resulted in decisions to not
reject the null hypothesis for Hypotheses and (F<1, see Table ?)•
( o
%pothesis^ predicted that collusive dyads would use more feedback cues
than non-collusive dyads. Hypothesis- concerns Machiavellianism and the
o
use of feedback cues. The interaction between collusion and power yielded 
an F value of 1.699 (df=l,37; p=.20) resulting in a decision to suspend 
judgement.
Self Reference Pronouns 
Hypothesis^ predicted that collusive dyads would use more self 
reference pronouns than non-collusive dyads. None of the values ob­
tained in the statistical analysis of self reference pronouns were sig­
nificant (p-<.05) or sufficiently large to suspend judgement (see Table 
8). On the basis of these results, the decision was made to not reject 
the null hypothesis for Hypothesis^.
Verbs Accompanied by Modifiers 
Hypothesis^^ posited a significant collusion by power interac­
tion for the use of verbs accompanied by modifiers. The analysis of 
the collusion by power interaction yielded an F value less than 1.0 
(see Table 9) resulting in a decision to not reject the null hypothesis 
for Hypothesis^^. The F value for the main effect for power was 3*301 
(df=l,37; p=.07) resulting in a decision to suspend judgement.
Unmodified Verbs and Nouns 
The results of the analysis of unmodified verbs and nouns yielded
two significant F values. As predicted by Hypothesis^^, a significant
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main effect for power was observed. (F (l,37)=5-625; p=.02; see Table 
10). Players in the p position used more unmodified verbs and nouns 
than players in the o position. In addition to the main effect for 
power, a significant collusion by power interaction was observed 
(F (1,37)=5.o62; p=.03).
Summary of Results 
The results of the data analysis yielded two F values sufficient 
to reject n u U  hypotheses, and four F values sufficient to suspend 
judgement concerning null hypotheses. Both a significant main effect 
for power and a significant interaction between collusion and power for 
the proportion of unmodified verbs and nouns were observed. Main effects 
for power for the use of modified nouns and modified verbs and inter­
action effects between collusion and power for the use of feedback cues 
and nouns with sensory referents resulted in decisions to suspend judge­
ment concerning the null hypotheses. For all other relationships 
tested, the null hypothesis was retained.
Discussion of Co-variance Analysis 
The interpretation of the results of the data analysis just re­
ported is somewhat problematic. The interpretation of differences between 
groups adjusted on the basis of a co-variate can be misleading if the ob­
served relationship between the co-variate and the criterion variable is 
spurious. In such cases, a co-variate may obscure the true relationship 
between direct variâtes and criterion variables.
In the present study, the null hypothesis was retained for tests 
of the relationship between Machiavellianism and all dependent variables. 
That the null hypothesis was so consistently retained constitutes
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justification for re-analyzing the data to determine if the variance 
attributed to Machiavellianism in the analysis of co-variance could he 
attributed to collusion, power, or the interaction between collusion 
and power. All dependent verbal behaviors were re-analyzed using a 
2 x 2  factorial analysis of variance design with collusion and power 
treated as fixed factors.
Analysis of Variance Results
The re-analysis of data yielded three F values with probabili­
ties less than .05 and three F values with probabilities sufficient to 
justify suspending judgement. Tests of relationship for the variables 
"total words," "total utterances" and "nouns" yielded F values which 
resulted in decisions to retain the null hypothesis for the relation­
ships tested. Tests on the variables "modified nouns," "feedback cues," 
"self-reference pronouns," "modified verbs," and "unmodified verbs and 
nouns" each yielded an F value sufficient to reject the null hypothesis 
or suspend judgement.
Re-analysis of the data related to the use of "nouns with sensory 
referents" yielded results similar to the analysis of co-variance. The 
analysis yielded a p value of approximately .17 (see Table 11) for the 
interaction between collusion and power, resulting in a decision to 
suspend judgement concerning the null hypothesis. Examination of the 
cell means (see Table 12) suggests that the observed degree of rela­
tionship might be attributable to the differences in the encoding 
behaviors of players p and o in the collusive dyads, while the cell 
means for p and o in the non-collusive dyads appear approximately equal.
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Analysis of co-variance for the use of modified nouns resulted in 
a decision to suspend judgement concerning the null hypothesis for the 
relationship between power and the use of modified nouns. The analysis 
of variance for this data indicates that a decision to reject the null 
hypothesis for this relationship is warranted (F (1,38) = 5*981; 
p=.02; see Table 13). Examination of the cell means (see Table 12) 
reveals that players in the less powerful p position used proportionally 
more modified nouns than players in the o position.
Re-analysis of the feedback cue data supported the original 
decision to suspend judgement concerning the null hypothesis for the 
interaction between collusion and power (F (1,38) = I.718; p=.20; see 
Table l4). Examination of cell means for the variable (see Table 12) 
suggests that p uses more feedback cues than o in collusive dyads and 
that o uses more feedback cues than p in the non-coUusive dyads.
As with the analysis of co-variance, the analysis of variance 
for the use of self-reference pronouns warrants a decision to suspend 
judgement concerning the null hypothesis for the relationship between 
collusion and the use of self-reference pronouns (F (1,38) = 2.548; 
p=.12; see Table I5). Cell means (see Table 12) indicate that collusive 
dyads may use more self-reference pronouns than non-collusive dyads.
Analysis of co-variance for the use of modified verbs yielded a 
decision to suspend judgement for the main effect due to power. The 
re-analysis indicates that a decision to reject the null hypothesis for 
the main effect due to power is warranted (F (1,38) = 9*892; p=.003; 
see Table I6). Examination of the cell means (see Table 12) reveals 
that players in the more powerful o position modify more verbs than
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players in the less powerful p position.
The analysis of co-variance for the nse of unmodified verbs and 
nouns yielded significant F values for the main effect due to power and 
the interaction between collusion and power. Reanalysis of the data, 
yielded a decision to reject the null hypothesis for the interaction 
between collusion and power (F (1,38) = 5-137; p=.03; see Table 17) 
and a decision to not reject the null hypothesis for the main effect due 
to power (F (1,38) = 1.172; p=2$). To determine the sources of the sig­
nificant interaction, the differences among the cell means were analyzed 
using Duncan's multiple Range statistic (Bruning and Kintz, I968). The 
analysis of means (see Table 12) revealed that subjects in the p posi­
tion in the non-collusive dyads use significantly fewer unmodified verbs 
than all other players and that players in the o position in the non- 
coUusive dyads used significantly more unmodified verbs and nouns than 
players in the o position of the collusive dyads.
Additional Variables 
To clarify relationships observed in the previous analyses of 
the data, several related variables were selected for analysis. Addi­
tional variables considered are unmodified verbs, unmodified nouns, verb 
modifiers, and noun modifiers.
To determine if the significant collusion by power interaction 
for the use of unmodified verbs and nouns was attributable to either 
the noun or verb sub-categories, unmodified nouns and unmodified verbs 
were analyzed separately.
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The analysis of unmodified, verbs yielded a significant collusion 
by power interaction (F (1,38) = 5.031; p=.03; see Table l8). Examina­
tion of the cell means (see Table 20) reveals that players in the p and 
0 positions exhibit different patterns of encoding behavior in the collu­
sion and non-collusion conditions. In the collusive dyads, players in 
the p position use more unmodified verbs than players in the o position. 
This pattern is reversed in the non-coUusive condition. Players in 
the o position in the non-collusive condition used the most unmodified 
verbs while players in the p position in the non-collusive condition 
used the fewest.
The analysis of unmodified nouns indicates that a decision to 
suspend judgement for the collusion by power interaction is warranted,
(F (1,38) = 1.773; p=.19; see Table I9). Examination of the cell means 
(see Table 20) reveals a tendency toward the pattern of encoding ob­
served for the use of unmodified verbs.
Because the modified verbs and modified noun variables are not 
a complete index of the extent to which modifiers are used, a decision 
was made to examine the proportions of verb modifiers and noun modifiers.
The analysis of verb modifiers yielded F values of less than
1.0 for all tests of significance (see Table 21). Thus a decision was 
made to not reject the null hypothesis for the relationships tested.
The analysis of noun modifiers yielded a significant F value 
for the collusion by power interaction (F (1,38) = 6.247; p=.02; see 
Table 22) and a significant F value for the main effect for power 
(F (1,38) = 6.16I; p=.02). Analysis of the cell means (see Table 20) 
reveals that Player p in the non-collusive dyads used significantly
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more noun modifiers than other players. Thus, the interaction effect 
is attributable primarily to the discrepancy between positions o and p 
in the non-collusive dyads.
Summary of Results 
In the present study, the relationships between the independent 
variables of Machiavellianism, power, and collusion and 13 dependent 
verbal behaviors are considered. Analysis of the data using co-variance 
techniques resulted in decisions to retain the null hypothesis for tests 
of relationships between Machiavellianism and the dependent verbal 
behaviors. On the basis of these results, the decision was made to re­
analyze the data, dropping Machiavellianism as an independent variable.
Re-analysis of the data yielded three significant F values and 
three F values sufficient to suspend judgement concerning the null 
hypothesis. Power was observed to be significantly related to the use 
of both modified verbs and modified nouns. A significant interaction 
between collusion and power for the use of unmodified verbs and nouns 
was also noted. Judgement was suspended for the relationship between 
collusion, and self-reference pronouns and the relationships between 
collusion, power, and the dependent variables, feedback cues, and nouns 
with sensory referents.
Four additional variables were considered. Analysis of noun 
modifiers yielded a significant interaction between collusion and 
power. Analysis of verb modifiers resulted in decisions to retain the 
nul], hypothesis. Analysis of unmodified verbs yielded a significant 
collusion by power interaction. Judgement was suspended for the
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interaction between collusion and power for the use of unmodified nouns.
A discussion of this study and the results reported here is 
presented in the following chapter.
CHA.PTER IV
DISCUSSION
This chapter is presented in four parts. In the first section, 
interpretation of the data is considered. Section 2 considers the signi­
ficance of this research effort. limitations of this study are considered 
in the third section. Finally, suggestions for future research are 
presented.
Interpretation
In the present study, the null hypothesis was not rejected for 
10 of the 11 research hypotheses presented in Chapter I. Judgement was 
suspended for Hypothesis 9j which posited that collusive dyads would 
use more self-reference pronouns than non-collusive dyads. The data 
analysis did indicate significant relationships which were not predicted 
for the use of "modified nouns," "modified verbs," "unmodified verbs 
and nouns," "unmodified verbs," and "noun modifiers." Potentially sig­
nificant relationships were observed for the use of "feedback cues,"
"nouns with sensory referents," and "unmodified nouns." For reasons dis­
cussed in parts 2 and 3 of this chapter, a simple interpretation of 
these results is not possible. Some observations about the data are 
possible, however.
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with the exception of three variables, "modified verbs," "modified 
nouns," and "self-reference pronouns," the data is characterized by inter­
actions between collusion and power. This observation includes the three 
variables for which the null hypothesis was rejected, "unmodified verbs 
and nouns," "unmodified verbs," "noun modifiers," and the three variables 
for which judgement was suspended, "nouns with sensory referents," 
"feedback cues," and "unmodified nouns."
Two patterns of interactions are apparent in the data. The first 
pattern is characterized by a reciprocal or symmetrical pattern of 
encoding across power positions in the collusive and non-collusive dyads. 
That is, the behavior of the more powerful player o in the collusive 
dyads is similar to the behavior of the less powerful p in the non-collu­
sive dyads; and the behavior of the less powerful p in the collusive 
dyads is similar to the behavior of o in the non-collusive dyads. This 
pattern appears to characterize the use of unmodified verbs and perhaps 
feedback cues.
The first pattern of interactions indicates that social behaviors 
are not necessarily a simple function of message characteristics. Mes­
sages interact with situational variables such that similar messages 
do not yield similar results. For this pattern of interactions, who 
says what appears to be most important. When the less powerful p uses 
more unmodified verbs than o, they are identified as collusive. On the 
other hand, dyads in which p uses fewer unmodified verbs than o are ob­
served to be non-collusive.
The second pattern of interactions is characterized by an 
asymmetrical pattern of encoding. In this pattern, the behavior of
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players p and o within one of the two collusion conditions are similar 
while behaviors of p and o in the other condition are different. Also, 
at least one of the cell means in the condition in which significant 
differences are observed is also significantly different from at least 
one mean in the other condition. That is p^ = oj_, P2 ^ Og, and Pg and/ 
or Og / Pj_ and/or o^ . This pattern appears to characterize the use of 
unmodified verbs and nouns, noun modifiers, and perhaps nouns with 
sensory referents and unmodified nouns.
The second pattern of interactions suggests that there are ver­
bal behaviors which do uniquely characterize collusive and non-collusive 
relationships. However, these behaviors are characteristic of a single 
power position. Thus, players in collusive dyads behave similarly with 
respect to the use of unmodified verbs and nouns, noun modifiers, and 
unmodified nouns while the less power p in the non-collusive dyads uses 
fewer unmodified verbs and nouns, fewer unmodified nouns, and more noun 
modifiers than o in the non-collusive dyads.
The main effect results are more easily understood. Two of the 
variables studied appear related to the power construct. Players in the 
more powerful o position used more modified verbs and fewer modified 
nouns than players in the less powerful o position. It also appears 
that the hypothesis that collusive dyads use more self-reference pro­
nouns remains tenable.
Significance
Research may be considered significant for any number of dif­
ferent reasons. This study is considered significant because of the 
relationships it reveals among the concepts studied. It is also
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considered significant because of what it tells us about the methods 
used in the gathering and analysis of data. It may also be considered 
significant on the basis of its potential contribution to the theoretic 
maturity of its parent discipline.
Three types of knowledge claims are made concerning relationships 
among concepts. First, this study identifies five manifest verbal be­
haviors which appear to be significantly related to collusion and/or 
power. Second, this study provides a substantive body of data to sup­
port the conclusion that Machiavellianism is not related to the manifest 
verbal behaviors studied. Third, four manifest verbal behaviors are 
identified which may be related to collusion and/or power. Knowledge 
claims of the first and second type are sufficient to document signifi­
cance on the basis of knowledge concerning relationships.
With respect to methodological significance, two aspects of this 
study are considered important. First, the results of this study reflect 
the utility of the computer program SLCA-II for the study of verbal 
behavior. Second, subjectively speaking, the present study represents 
a satisfactory test of the decision rule guidelines suggested in Chapter
II. This means that statements concerning the acceptance or rejection 
of the null hypotheses are made with considerable confidence. Subse­
quent research will however, be able to make an objective assessment of 
the effect of these decision rules upon the üÿpe II error rate.
With respect to potential theoretic contributions, two claims 
are made. First, this study is the first to describe the verbal behavior 
of collusive and non-collusive dyads. Second, this study links commu­
nication at a syntactic level to communication at a pragmatic level
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(Morris, 1946).
The first cla±m to significance is predicated upon the precept 
that necessary observation and description are necessary precursors.
In recent journal articles, Fisher (1977), Scheidel (1977), and Hawes 
(1977) have fl.l 1 noted the relationship between description and theory, 
and also observed the need for more descriptive research within the 
discipline of speech communication. Hawes (1977, 64) summarizes this 
viewpoint in a critique of theoretic approaches to the study of commu­
nication.
Communication has never gone through the phase of system­
atically observing, describing, and interpreting all manner 
of human communicative activity. During the three or so 
generations we have been training social and behavioral 
scientists, few have been trained to observe, describe, and 
interpret; most have been trained to experiment. But now, 
concern is being expressed about the questions we ask and 
the variables we manipulate and control. . . .Perhaps, so 
goes the thinking, the problem is a confusion over which 
mold we ought cast our theories into. On the contrary, I 
think the problem is insufficient description and inter­
pretation of the communicative activity our theories are 
supposed to explain.
Hopefully, as suggested in the first chapter, studies of the 
present type will lead to a more precise conceptualization of communica­
tion. Previously, potential for communication, the opportunity to con­
verse in a face-to-face setting, has been identified as a cause of the 
social behavior collusion. In the present study, certain verbal behav­
iors of collusive and non-collusive communicators are observed to differ 
significantly. Some of the verbal behaviors are also observed to co- 
vary with the situational variable power. These findings are evidence 
for the potential of this line of research to produce meaningful hypo­
theses and theories.
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The second claim to significance is predicated upon Morris' 
division of the study of sign behavior into the study of syntactics, 
semantics, and pragmatics. Syntactics refers to the relationship be­
tween signs. Semantics refers to the relationships between signs and 
their referents. Pragmatics refers to the relationships between signs 
and their users. More explicitly, pragmatics, refers to what users do 
with signs, their social effects (Morris, 19^6, 1971)- A theory of signs 
or communication must account for variance at and between these three 
levels of analysis.
To say that something is done by some other thing is to imply a 
cause effect relationship. If communication is a cause of collusion, 
then, at a pragmatic level of analysis, it can be said that collusion is 
done by communication. The dependent verbal behaviors in this study, 
observed to be related to collusive behavior, are syntactic variables. 
Thus, in this study, communication at a syntactic level is observed to 
be empirically related to communication at a pragmatic level.
limitations
The following limitations should be taken into consideration in 
interpreting the results of this study.
First, the research reported is descriptive. While the time 
ordering of variables in the study may imply causal relationships, no 
manipulations of variables were utilized. Thus, causal interpretations 
of relationships must be considered hypothetical.
56
Second, the descriptions of encoding "behavior are constructed 
from the analysis of multiple utterances. That is the data may not 
necessarily he said to characterize particular utterances.
Third, only a single semantic characteristic of the messages was 
considered. Any attempts to infer meaning based on the analysis of syn­
tactic characteristics or the sensory/non-sensory characteristics of 
referents is speculative.
Fourth, possible relationships between dependent variables are 
not considered. It is possible that variables considered in combination 
may be significantly related to collusion and/or power while when con­
sidered independently no significant relationships are observed.
Finally, as the results of a single study, the findings reported 
here must be considered tentative. Additional observation is necessary 
to indicate the true generalizability of the results of this study.
Directions for Future Research
As a result of this study, some suggestions are made concerning 
future efforts. First, future research should consider additional syn­
tactic variables for analysis. The data analyzed here do not present a 
complete description of the syntactic characteristics of the messages 
encoded. A complete account of syntactic variation is necessary for the 
development of theory.
Second, multivariate techniques should be used in the analysis of 
data. The promise of such an approach is to reduce a large number of 
observations to a smaller, meaningful, and more precise set of observa­
tions. For example, it may be that qualified verbs is a significant
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variable when and only when total verbs encoded are also considered.
Third, future research efforts should include semantic analysis 
of the observed verbal behaviors. Identification of utterances within 
message corpi as influences attempts, information seeking, information 
giving, etc. would increase the probability of developing an explana­
tory theory of considerable power. Concommitant with this third recom­
mendation is the need to determine how subjects approach the experimental 
situation. The question of how the game is perceived, for example as a 
problem solving situation or a corrpliance gaining situation, has sig­
nificant implications for the development of an investigative and in­
terpretive framework.
Finally additional individual difference variables should be 
considered. The belief that the characteristics that the individual 
brings to the situation influence both language behavior and subsequently 
the outcomes of communication events remains primitive and is an impor­
tant element of the research model utilized in this study. In addition 
to other personality variables, future research should consider indi­
vidual difference variables related to success at problem-solving, such 
as intelligence or cognitive style.
Conclusion
While none of the hypotheses tested in this study are directly 
supported by the results, significant relationships are observed between 
selected verbal behaviors and the situational variable power and the 
social behavior collusion. These findings support the utility of the 
research strategy advocated in the first chapter. That is, by consid­
ering communication as a complex set of variables, a more precise
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xmderstariding of comnrunication and its role in facilitating other 
"behaviors may he achieved. Hopefully, this study will he a useful 
model in guiding research efforts in this area and in related areas of 
research.
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READ EACH STATEMENT CAREFULLY - then Indicate the extent to 
which you agree or disagree by darkening in the corresponding 
number from the following choices;
1 = Agree Strongly 4
2 » Agree Somewhat 5
3 = Agree Slightly 6
Disagree Slightly 
Disagree Somewhat 
Disagree Strongly
Work quickly and remember that first impressions are usually 
best in these matters. Please give your opinion on each 
statement.
O — «N ^ -C
m  -7  s3 rs  eg
1. Never tell anyone the real reason you did something unless it is 
useful to do so.
2. The best way to handle people is to tell them what they want to hear.
3. One should take action only when sure it is morally right.
4. Most people are basically good and kind.
5. It is safest to assume that all people have a vicious streak and
it will come out when they are given a chance.
6. Honesty is the best policy in all cases.
7. There is no excuse for lying to someone else.
8. Generally speaking, men won't work hard unless they're forced to do so.
S. All in all, it is better to be humble and honest than to be important 
and dishonest.
10. When you ask someone to do something for you, it is best to give the 
real reasons for wanting it rather than giving reasons which carry 
more weight.
11. Most people who get ahead in the world lead clean moral lives.
12. Anyone who completely trusts anyone else is asking for trouble.
13. The biggest difference between cost criminals and other people is 
that the criminals are stupid enough to get caught.
14. Most men are brave.
15. It is wise to flatter important people.
16. It is possible to be good in all respects.
17. B a m u m  was wrong when he said that there's a sucker b o m  every minute.
18. It is hard to get ahead without cutting comers here and there.
19. People suffering from incurable diseases should have the choice of 
being put painlessly to death.
20. Most men forget more easily the death of their father than the loss 
of their property.
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Instructions
The game you are to play is very simple. Read the instructions helow 
very carefully. After the game begins the experimenter will not answer 
any questions.
There are two players: P and 0. You are player_______ .
The game is played using a game matrix (there is an exan^le below). In 
order to score points each player mast choose a payoff-letter. Player 
P may choose either A or B and player 0 may choose either C or D. The 
game matrix is divided into four parts for scoring purposes. Each 
player's score is determined by both players’ decisions. If player P 
chooses the payoff-letter A and player 0 chooses the payoff-letter D, 
their scores will be found in the lower left hand square of the game 
matrix. Using the example below player P would have a score of -2 and 
player 0 would have a score of 3«
There are 10 scoring rounds to a game. A round consists of a one minute- 
thirty second study/discussion period and a thirty second decision/ 
scoring period. Points are scored during the thirty second decision/ 
scoring period. During the one minute-thirty second study/discussion 
period, you may communicate freely with the other player, but you cannot 
receive any points. In order to score points during the thirty second 
decision/ scoring period you must write your choice of payoff-letters 
upon the pad in front of you upon the table and share that information 
with the other player. When you have exchanged information with the 
other player, examine the matrix to determine your score for that round 
and write your score on the appropriate place upon the scorepad. You 
will receive no score for a round if you mark your decision prior to or 
after the thirty second decision/scoring period. The experimenter will 
notify you of the beginning of the thirty second period by holding up a 
sheet of paper with 30 seconds written on it. A whistle will be blown 
to signal the end of the thirty second period.
The game matrix to be used in this study is face down in front of you.
Do not turn it over until instructed to do so. It is different from 
the example. You will use the same matrix for all 10 rounds of the game. 
If you have any questions, ask them now I If you have no questions, 
return this sheet to the experimenter.
Remember you can only mark decisions and receive points during the 30 
second period. Feel free to communicate with the other player, but do 
not talk to the experimenter once the game begins.
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People take turns talking in conversations. The amount of speech en­
coded during turns varies. A turn in conversation may consist of 1 
or more complete utterances. An utterance is the conceptual equivalent 
of the sentence in •written language. However utterances are not sentences. 
They are often only meaningful within the context of the conversation in 
which they occur. An utterance is the nrinnimiTn linguistic unit which can 
stand as a turn in conversation. Speaker change tends to occur at the 
end of utterances. True interruptions and overlapping tend to occur in­
frequently in most conversations.
Your task w i H  he to judge the number of utterances that are present in 
a number of transcripts of conversations that I have made. The transcripts 
consist of the conversation between 2 people who are playing a game (the 
game "will be explained after you have read these instructions in order to 
provide you with contextual information that may be necessary to make 
judgements). In the transcripts all of the tums of the first person to 
speak are underlined. The first word of each speaker's turn is capital­
ized and an asterisk follows the last word of each speaker's turn. Con­
tractions are indicated by apostrophes and incomplete words are followed 
by a dash. No other punctuation is provided.
Guide lines
Before making any judgements read the entire transcript. Then begin with 
the first complete turn of the first speaker. Always take into consid­
eration the speech of the preceding and succeeding speaker. Mark the 
transcripts in the following manner. Place a line behind the last word 
of each utterance in the transcripts. It is possible that a few true 
interruptions appear in the transcripts you will be judging. If an ut­
terance is incomplete (interrupted) circle the last word of the incom­
plete utterance. If the incomplete utterance is completed during a suc­
ceeding -turn by the same speaker draw a line from the point of interrup­
tion to the first word of the speakers next turn. Do not draw the line 
through the speech of the other speaker.
You will judge 10 or 11 transcripts in addition to those used for train­
ing. Work at your own pace and work carefully. Feel free to take breaks 
whenever necessary. But please don't discuss the transcripts until all 
judging is completed.
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Jones and Brunsman
You know so i get 4* Okay hmm i see how it’s working now* What you got 
you put down a minus 8 don’t you* Yeah* I guess it’s just kind of a re­
action game you know what you put down* Right we’re we're playing back 
off each other right so there isn’t let’s see* Excuse me* Him i don’t 
know what to think about this now i got confused* Here we go* We mark* 
Yeah* C this time i guess we got to figure out how to one of us can 
win and the other one get a dollar or 2 you know from it* Well i don’t 
know how anyone is gonna win it you know actually c and a we both get 4 
you know really anybody who gets that 20 points man you know it’s gonna 
add up fast* Uhhuh* You know if you i wonder how he’s designed that so 
that you can pill out a 20 on it* Wll if i choose d and you choose b 
since i've a* Yeah Yeah that's true* How do you want to do it* You know 
that’s really weird like i can take all of the lowest i’ll get is a 
minu8_2* Uhhuh* The lowest you'll get is a minus 8 so i can blow it you 
know but* Let’s see as it is* Man that is really weird if you choose d i 
choose b we both lose at the same time* Same time* I guess we just fool 
around* No we don’t if i if i choose d and you choose b i get the 20 and 
you get the minus 2 if i choose d and you choose a like we did a while 
ago* Yeah* Then i get the minus 8* Yeah* and the most points you can get 
is 5+ points* Yeah* In one way* Kind of stuck* Tell you what you uh give 
me your uh b decision and i’ll take the d and i’ll give you uh 7 and one 
half out of the 15* Wow that’s a lot man* Can’t beat that* You gonna go 
that way* Well i’m i’m gonna go d because you know somebody’s gonna have 
to win* You want to do it that way* Well it’s up to you if you know so 
however you want to mark it* Well yeah i go a b*
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Gray and Knox
I don't know though i don't know we're -wasting a minute and a half here* 
Yeah* Shucks there ' s nothing j can do to score more than 4 points thou^* 
Well okay* Well* C* Okay i put d* 4* What for* What* What'd you do that 
for alright since there's no chance in me winning anything even though i 
did mess up on the second round i can't do nnich more than lose anyway so 
the only thing i can do is give it all to you and hope you come out on 
top at the end of this okay* It's fine with me* It’s fine with me you, 
don't mind winning do yon* Oh i guess not* Why do you keep looking over 
there anyway* Okay* Stalemate all the way down i could deceive you though 
and put a every time i guess i i shouldn't or i wouldn't or you'd have 
to trust me 1 of the 1 of the 2 Timm* Okay i put uh d* I put b* Got a 20 
uh a negative 2* Well i'm even right now anyway* Oh gee wonder if you get 
anything for the lowest score* I don't know*
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TAæiE 1
PEARSON EROrUCT MOMENT CORRELATIONS BETWEEN 
PLAYEEIS FOR DEPENDENT VERBAL BESAVIORS
Variable r Variable r
Total Words .320 Feedback Cues .306
Total Utterances .370 Self-reference .300
Pronouns
Nouns .146
Modified Verbs -.146
Nouns with .081
Sensory Referents Unmodified Verbs .080
and Nouns
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TâBLE 2
MCOVAE FOR TOTA.L WORDS
Source of 
Variation
Sum of 
Squares DF
Mean
Square F P
Covariate
Machiavellianism 9437.609 1 9437.609 0.932 0.99
Main Effects 
Collusion (c) 
Power (P)
2834.871
1631.669
1
1
2834.871
1631.669
0.280
0.161
0.99
0.99
Interaction 
C X P 1361.349 1 1361.349 0.134 0.99
Error 374506.937 37 10121.809
TABLE 3
ANCOVAR FOR TOTAL UTTERANCES
Source of 
Variation
Sum of 
Squares DF
Mean
Square F p
Covariate 
Machiavelliani sm 350.456 1 350.456 1.011 0.32
Main Effects 
Collusion (c) 
Power (p)
193.497
168.193
1
1
193.497
168.193
0.558
0.485
0.99
0.99
Interaction 
C X P 241.454 1 241.454 0.696 0.99
Error 12829.922 37 346.755
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TA3LE 4
MCOVAR FOR NOIMS
Source of 
Variation
Sum of 
Squares DF
Mean
Square F P
Covariate
Machiavel]ianism 0.001 1 0.001 0.269 0.99
Main Effects 
Collusion (C) 
Power (P)
0.000
0.000
1
1
0.000
0.000
0.019
0.083
0.99
0.99
Interaction 
C X P 0.003 1 0.003 1.186 0.28
Error 0.090 37 0.002
TABLE 5
MCOVAR FOR ROUES WITH SENSORY REFERENTS
Source of 
Variation
Sum of 
Squares DF
Mean
Square F p
Covariate
Machiavellianism 0.001 1 0.001 0.547 0.99
Mfa.in Effects 
Collusion (C) 
Power (P)
0.002
0.000
1
1
0.002
0.000
0.846
0.116
0.99
0.99
Interaction 
C X P 0.005 1 0.005 1.985 0.16
Error 0.096 37 0.003
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TA3LE 6
MCOVAR FOR MODIFIED NOIMS
Source of 
Variation
Sum of 
Squares DF
Mean
Square F P
Covariate
Machiavellianism 0.001 1 0.001 1.137 0.29
Main Effects 
Collusion (C) 
Power (P)
0.000
0.00%
1
1
0.000
0.004
0.030
3.572
0.99
0.06
Interaction 
P X C 0.000 1 0.000 0.070 0.99
Error 0.038 37 0.001
TABLE 7
MCOVAR FOR FEEDBACK CUES
Source of 
Variation
Sum of 
Squares DF
Mean
Square F P
Covariate
Machi aval 1 i ami sm 6.415 1 6.415 0.163 0.99
Main Effects 
Collusion (C) 
Power (P)
34.678
24.780
1
1
34.678
24.780
0.883
0.631
0.99
0.99
Interaction 
C X P 66.696 1 66.696 1.699 0.20
Error 1452.653 37 39.261
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TABLE 8
ANCOVAR FOR SELF-REFERENCE PRONOUNS
Source of 
Variation
Sum of 
Squares DF
Mean
Square F P
Covariate 
Machiavelli, an i sm 0.005 1 0.005 1.853 0.18
Main Effects 
Collusion (C) 
Power (P)
0.005
0.000
1
1
0.005
0.000
1.902
0.020
0.17
0.99
Interaction 
C X P 0.000 1 0.000 0.108 0.99
Error 0.104 37 0.003
TABLE 9
ANCOVAR FOR MODIFIED VERBS
Source of 
Variation
Sum of 
Squares DF
Mean
Square F P
Covariate 
MartTTi aval 1 i ani sm 0.000 1 0.000 0.214 0.99
î'îa.in Effects 
Collusion (c) 
Power (P)
0.000
0.003
1
1
0.000
0.003
0.023
3.301
0.99
0.07
Interaction 
C X P 0.000 1 0.000 0.214 0.99
Error 0.034 37 0.001
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TABLE 10
AUCOVAR FOR ^ MODIFIED VERBS AND NOTINS
Sotirce of 
Variation
Sum of 
Squares DF
Mean
Square F p
Covariate 
Machiavellianism 0.002 1 0.992 0.191 0.99
Main Effects 
Collusion (C) 
Power (P)
0.010
0.050
1
1
0.010
0.050
1.116
5.625
0.30
0.02
Interaction 0.045 1 0.045 5.062 0.03
Error 0.327 37 0.009
TABLE 11
ANOVA FOR NOUES WITH SENSORY REFERENTS
Source of 
Variation
Sum of 
Squares DF
Mean
Square F P
Main Effects 
Collusion (c) 
Power (P)
0.000
0.003
1
1
0.000
0.003
0.010
1.000
0.99
0.325
Interaction 
C X P 0.005 1 0.005 1.970 0.17
Error 0.098 38 0.003
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TABLE 12
UMDJUSTED GROUP MEANS FOR DEPENDENT VERBAL BEHAVIORS
Variable
Collusive DyadS ' 
Player P Player 0
Non-CoUusive Dyads 
Player P Player 0
*Total Words 190.73 185.91 190.80 209.90
*Total Utterances 46.00 42.18 43.20 48.4
*Nouns 0.216 0.189 0.186 0.192
Nouns with 
Sensoiy Referents 0.172 0.149 0.130 0.132
Modified Nouns 0.094 0.072 0.097 0.070
Feedback Cues 13.36 10.55 10.90 13.10
Self-reference 
Pronouns 0.195 0.211 0.162 0.166
Modified Verbs 0.058 0.090 0.069 0.094
^Unmodified Verbs 
and Nouns 0.452ab o.teo^ 0.365 0.465%
*AU tests of significance resulted in decisions to retain the null 
hypothesis.
**Cell means with common subscripts are not significantly different at 
the p . 05 level. Comparisons were made using Duncan’s Multiple Range 
Test.
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TA3LE 13
MOVA FOR MODIFIED NOUNS
Source of 
Variation
Sum of 
Squares DF
Mean
Square F P
Main Effects 
Collusion (C) 
Power (P)
0.000
0.006
1
1
0.000
0.006
0.001
5.961
0.99
0.02
Interaction 
C X P 0.000 1 0.000 0.060 0.99
Error 0.039 38 0.001
TABLE Ik
ANOVA FOR FEEDBACK CUES
Source of 
Variation
Sum of 
Squares DF
Mean
Square F p
Main Effects 
Collusion (C) 
Power (P)
0.022
1.929
1
1
0.022
1.929
0.001
0.050
0.99
0.99
Interaction 
C X P 65.953 1 65.953 1.718 0.20
Error IU59.O68 38 38.397
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TABLE 15
MOVA FOR SELF-REFERENCE FRONOTMS
Source of 
Variation
Sum of 
Squares DF
Mean
Square F P
Main Effects 
Collusion (C) 
Power (P)
0.007
0.001
1
1
0.007
0.001
2.548
0.318
0.12
0.99
Interaction 
C X P 0.000 1 0.000 0.090 0.99
Error 0.109 38 0.003
TABLE l6
MOVA FOR MODIFIED VEEŒS
Source of 
Variation
Sum of 
Squares DF
Mean
Square F P
Main Effects 
Collusion (C) 
Power (P)
0.000
0.009
1
1
0.000
0.009
0.464
9.892
0.99
0.003
Interaction 
C X P 0.000 1 0.000 0.227 0.99
Error 0.035 38 0.001
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TAJLE 17
MOVA FOR UNMODIFIED VERBS AND NOUNS
Source of 
Variation
Sum of 
Squares DF
Mean
Square F P
Main Effects 
Collusion (C) 
Power (P)
0.005
0.010
1
1
0.005
0.010
0.588
1.172
0.99
0.29
Interaction 
C X P 0.044 1 0.044 5.137 0.03
Error 0.329 38 0.009
TABLE 10
MOVA FOR UNMODIFIED VERBS
Source of 
Variation
Sum of 
Squares DF
Mean
Square F P
Main Effects 
Collusion (C) 
Power (P)
0.001
0.003
1
1
0.001
0.003
0.156
0.770
0.99
0.99
Interaction 
P X C 0.022 1 0.022 5.031 0.03
Error 0.17 38 0.004
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table 19
MOVA FOR UmODIFIED ÏÏOÜUS
Source of 
Variation
Sum of 
Squares DF
Mean
Square F P
Main Effects 
Collusion (C) 
Power (P)
0.002
0.002
1
1
0.002
0.002
0.904
0.842
0.99
0.99
Interaction 
C X P 0.004 1 0.004 1.773 0.19
Error 0.080 38 0.002
TABLE 20
GROUP MEMS FOR ADDITIOKAL VERBAL BEHAVIOR VARIABLES
Variable
Collusive Dyads 
Player P Player 0
Non-Collusive Dyads 
Player P Player 0
^Unmodified Verbs 0.331a 0.305a 0.276a 0.343a
Unmodified Nouns 0.122 0.117 0.089 0.122
Verb Modifiers 0.116 0.131 0.124 0.118
*Noun Modifiers 0.275a 0.273a 0.336 0.242a
*Cell means with common subscripts are not significantly different at 
the p . 05 level. Comparisons were made using Duncan’s Multiple Range 
Test.
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TABLE 21 
AHOVA FOE VERB MODIFIERS
Source of 
Variation
Sum of 
Squares DF
Mean
Square F P
Main Effects 
Collusion (C) 
Power (P)
0.000
0.000
1
1
0.000
0.000
0.055
0.128
0.99
0.99
Interaction 
C X P 0.001 1 0.001 0.595 0.99
Error 0.073 38 0.002
TABLE 22
AEOVA FOR nom MODlilEHS
Source of 
Variation
Sum of 
Squares DF
Mean
Square F p
Main Effects 
Collusion (C) 
Power (P)
0.002
0.022
1
1
0.002
0.022
0.694
6.161
0.99
0.02
Interaction 
C X P 0.022 1 0.022 6.247 0.02
Error 0.136 38 0.004
